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The question of commodity policy is central on
the UNCTAD agenda. It is not quite so clear
how central it is to the new international eco-
nomic order but it clearly is important there also.
In the current discussion the question usually
presents itself as proposals for an 'integrated
policy' (linked with UNCTAD and with the
broad support of the Third World) versus the
'commodity-by-commodity approach' (favoured
by the First World, with various nuances and
distinctions).
However, this is a framework which, while it
may be necessary for specific international dis-
cussion, is too narrow within the context of a new
international economic order. For that purpose it
may be useful to distinguish four rather than
two families of possible approaches and action.
These are, in addition to the integrated and com-
modity-by-commodity approach, the financial
compensatory approach and the structural
approach.
The financial compensatory approach has also
been actively discussed and in fact has been
included by UNCTAD as an element in its
integrated approach. To the industrial countries,
however, it looks more like an alternative to the
integrated approach and as complementarya
'second leg'to the commodity-by-commodity
approach.
The structural approach is surprisingly neglected
in the current discussions, probably because it is
too 'interdisciplinary' to fit tidily into a negotiat-
ing pattern. The structural approach looks at
trade in commodities not by itself but as part of
a chain of production, transport, distribution,
financing, etc as well as trade. The structural
approach may be exemplified by the case of
bananas, where it is found on analysis that little
more than one-tenth of the final consumer dollar
spent on bananas accrues to the actual producers,
and only a fraction of that to the indigenous
small producer. In such situations, obviously
much can be done to increase the income of the
small local producer even without the usual
instruments of commodity agreements.
The structural approach has been recently em-
phasized in research and analysis within the IDS,
to begin with on a commodity-by-commodity
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basis. Its advantage is that it has a natural focus
on the weaker commodities whereas concentration
on conventional commodity agreements has the
opposite tendency of 'to him who hath shall be
given'. A further advantage is that its natural
focus on individual commodities could recom-
mend it to First World thinking, while its
emphasis on major structural changes could
recommend it to more radical Third World
thinking. It has the disadvantage, however, ut
being clearly more difficult to negotiate than
either simple agreements of a conventional type
or global agreements of the financial compen-
satory type or common funds for an integrated
commodity policy.
For this reason, financial compensatory arrange-
ments are a more direct and realistic alternative
to commodity policy in the strict sense. The
preference they enjoy from the First World
industrial countries is clear. It has several sources:
They do not interfere with market mechanisms
this appeals of course particularly to the
ideologically market-oriented countries, such as
the US and West Germany.
They keep political and economic control more
firmly in the hands of the countries which supply
the money for the compensatory schemes, i.e.
the industrial countries (although possibly OPEC
may take some share). This will be particularly
tLue if the financial compensatory schemes are
vested in the IMF as they are at present; it will
be less true if such schemes are shifted into
UNCTAD or other bodies where Third World
countries have more control. It is not necessarily
true that financial compensatory schemes give
more control to the industrial countries. One can
certainly imagine, on the one hand, compensatory
schemes in which the compensation is auto-
matically given on certain objective criteria, with-
out strings attached and in the form of grants;
and, on the other hand, commodity agreements
which are very much hedged with conditions and
provisos, giving a good deal of control to the
consumer countries. However, in practice it is
likely to be the other way round. Higher revenue
to producers under commodity agreements are
normally without repayment conditions and are
unconditionally at the disposal of the exporting
country, while financial compensation is usually
given as a loan (except perhaps for the poorest
countries) and could become subject to conditions
of the producers 'putting their house in order',
particularly if administered by the IMF.
For the industrial countries, with clever
arrangements the financing of compensatory
schemes can be in political terms 'cost free'. One
example would be the financing of compensatory
schemes through gold sales by the IMF as
presently agreed in the arrangements for the IMF
Trust Fund. At a later date such schemes could
be financed from the 'link' with SDRs even
though at the present time the 'link' seems to have
been pushed into the background. In a different
sense the industrial countries can always take the
resources for contributing to compensatory
schemes from their normal aid programmes and
this will make them cost free in a political sense.
Compensatory schemes do not impose specific
burdens on specific consumers or consuming
industries in respect of specific commodities. The
burden is therefore less visible and the need for
politically difficult adjustment policies and
measures of internal redistribution is thereby
avoided.
There are also features of financial compen-
satory schemes which are particularly emphasized
by the industrial countries and which would be
genuinely advantageous to poor exporting coun-
tries. Such financial agreements can be impartially
applied to strong and weak commodities, they can
be integrated or commodity-by-commodity de-
pending on whether the export proceeds to be
stabilized are those of individual commodities,
many or all commodities taken together, or even
total export proceeds from all sources. They result
in payments to the governments of exporting
countries, rather than to wealthy producers, or
producers in rich countries or subsidiaries of
multinational corporations in the Third World
exporting countries. Of course, the fact that the
payment goes to the government can also be
considered a disadvantage, where the government
policy is not directed to relief of poverty or to
other types of true development. However, even
in the case of commodity agreements which raise
prices in world markets or stabilise the volume
of demand in world markets, a non-developmental
government will find it possible to divert the
benefit to non-developmental purposes.
Finally, compensatory arrangements are also
presented by industrial countries as avoiding
some of the 'anti-productive' features of com-
modity agreements, i.e. stimulating excessive new
investment in the case of high prices or the
stimulation of synthetic substitutes, etc. But this
is a questionable argument: rationally at least,
the benefits of financial compensatory payments
and the additional guarantee of proceeds offered
by compensatory schemes should have a similar
effect to artificially raised commodity prices in the
case of stimulating new investment, although not
in stimulating synthetic or other substitution.
1f an academic writer can presume to give any
advice to the Third World countries, it would
be this: It seems that the industrial countries
are willing to consider much wider and much
better financed compensatory schemes than the
present small beginnings such as the IMF facility
or the Stabex plan in the Lome Agreement. There
seems no reason why major schemes of this kind
could not become an important element of the
new international economic order as visualized
by the Third World. By going along with the
industrial countries in a preference for financial
compensation over certain forms of more specific
commodity policy, the Third World countries
should be able to obtain three very important
concessions: (I) that the export earnings to be
stabilized should be real export earnings and not
money export earningsthis would introduce
the principle of indexation at the point where
it would probably be most acceptable to the
industrial countries, (2) to make arrangements for
the control of such compensatory schemes to be
to a significant extent in their hands, and (3) that
the compensatory payments be made to a signi-
ficant extent, and particularly to the poorer
countries, in the form of grants so as not to add
to debt burdens. One would also think that the
Third World could accept such arrangements as
a complement rather than a substitute for more
specific commodity policy measures, which would
in any case take much longer to negotiate. They
might reflect that once the industrial countries
finance compensatory arrangements, they them-
selves acquire a vested interest in commodity
arrangements which would minimize the call on
the funds for the financial compensatory schemes.
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